A Tale of Two Kings: The Divergent Educational Visions of a Grandfather and Grandson in Afghanistan
Introduction
In the late 19th century, Afghanistan changed from a tribal system to a centralized monarchy under Amir Abdur Rahman Khan's rule. As he consolidated power, the Amir shifted the source of political legitimacy from the people to divine authority, relying on religion to justify his rule. This not only led to autocratic governance but also gave religious clerics significant power in legitimizing state authority, limiting the prospects for modern, secular education.
The second critical moment came in 1919, when King Amanullah Khan gained Afghanistan's independence and launched a modernization program with education reform at its core. Under his leadership, the country moved towards a constitutional monarchy, culminating in the 1923 Constitution that established equal rights and compulsory primary education. Unlike his grandfather, Amanullah sought to reduce the political influence of religious clerics by removing them from powerful positions in the royal court and judiciary. This challenged the clerical order, which had long benefited from the monarchy's patronage and had significant influence over public life.
Each of these events took apart around four decades and occurred within the same reign, starting with the grandfather's founding and almost being taken down by the grandson. These incidents have profound impacts on the discourse of modern education until this day.
Despite their lasting influence on the structure, accessibility, and perception of education, these events have received little attention in academic literature.
Background
During the early to mid-19th century, Afghanistan's educational system was predominantly traditional, fragmented, and largely isolated from the scientific and intellectual advancements taking place globally. By the latter half of the 19th century, most Afghans still held a geocentric perspective of the universe, with limited geographic knowledge beyond their local areas. Literacy rates were significantly low, and education was primarily available through mosques, which lacked standardized curricula and formal organization. These institutions mainly catered to the religious elite—mullahs, scribes, and a small group of urban students—offering little instruction beyond the memorization of religious textsn (Gregorian, 1969).
In rural regions, the curriculum was restricted to Persian language instruction and classical Persian literature, including the works of Saadi and Hafez, along with basic Arabic grammar. Madrasas, though scarce and located primarily in urban centers, were accessible only to a limited segment of the population. Their focus was mainly on Islamic theology and jurisprudence, reinforcing a scholarly tradition that prioritized conformity and religious orthodoxy over intellectual exploration or critical thought. Religious educators who pursued advanced studies in cities like Peshawar, Bukhara, or Hushtnuggur continued to depend on medieval Islamic texts rooted in metaphysics, logic, and fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), which contributed to a culture of anti-intellectualism and resistance to new ideas (Gregorian, 1969).
There was little to no government initiative to promote mass literacy, secular education, or public health awareness. However, this began to shift during the reign of Amir Shir Ali Khan (r. 1863–1866; 1868–1879), who initiated limited reforms aimed at modernizing the state. Recognizing the need for a skilled bureaucracy and military, he established Afghanistan’s first military academy, which included secular subjects such as mathematics, geography, and cartography. Notably, he also founded the first public school in Kabul’s Bala Hissar, which included both military and civilian divisions. This institution represented a significant change, as it offered English language instruction provided by Indian teachers—marking a departure from traditional Islamic teaching methods (Gregorian, 1969).
Despite these early efforts, education in 19th-century Afghanistan continued to be characterized by limited accessibility, religious dominance, and a strong skepticism towards foreign-inspired reforms. The foundations established by Shir Ali Khan were fragile and faced opposition, particularly from conservative religious clerics who perceived these reforms as conflicting with Afghan cultural and Islamic values. Therefore, while the late 19th century saw the beginnings of state interest in educational modernization, it remained largely experimental and inconsistent, with the majority of the population still relying on traditional religious forms of education.
The Two Kings
Two significant monarchical periods in Afghanistan’s modern history (1747–present) have profoundly shaped the politics of education—particularly in relation to female education policy—and continue to inform contemporary educational discourse. The first period, under Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880–1901), institutionalized a sharp divide between traditional madrassas and emerging modern schools, consolidating the authority of conservative religious clerics while actively suppressing the reformist educational initiatives of his predecessor, Amir Sher Ali Khan. This era established a rigid framework of educational control rooted in religious orthodoxy and state centralization, laying the foundation for a persistent ideological conflict over the purpose and governance of education.
In contrast, the second period, under King Amanullah Khan (1919–1929), sought to dismantle this legacy through ambitious modernization reforms aimed at transforming Afghanistan’s educational system and expanding access to girls' schooling. Yet, these reforms, rather than reconciling competing visions, triggered fierce resistance from religious elites and conservative factions. The resulting backlash not only derailed many of Amanullah’s initiatives but also deepened the ideological rift between traditionalist and modernist educational paradigms.
Taken together, these two reigns crystallized the foundational tensions between religious and secular visions of education in Afghanistan. They also provided the historical basis for contemporary actors—most notably the Taliban—to justify restrictive educational policies, particularly those targeting girls. The Taliban’s narrative draws heavily upon the precedent established during Abdur Rahman’s reign, reinforcing an exclusionary model of education that continues to marginalize female learners under the guise of religious and cultural authenticity.
The first incident has significance because the country blocked the idea of modern education and granted significant influence to the religious clerics, who were brought to the court by Amir to grant him legitimacy for rule. This happened at a time when other Muslim-majority countries such as Iran under Reza Shah, Egypt under Muhammad Ali's descendants and later King Fuad I, and Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had started reforms and changes to the educational system to grant modernization and craft a dual system of modern and religious education. Unlike Afghanistan, these countries have created harmony and compatibility between these two types of education. This case was, however, much different in Afghanistan.
The foundation of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan’s political strategy was rooted in his recognition that the prevailing religious educational institutions aligned closely with his objective of consolidating power. These institutions did not foster critical thinking or intellectual independence, thereby minimizing the risk of dissent or challenges to his authority. In contrast, students emerging from modern schools were perceived as potential threats due to their exposure to curiosity, critical reasoning, and an inclination to question the status quo. Although there was limited empirical evidence at the time that modern education across the globe had fully cultivated these attributes, the mere possibility appeared sufficient to alarm the Amir. This perception was further reinforced by the Afghan graduates of the Deoband madrassas in India, who contended that British colonial authorities had deliberately expanded modern schools as instruments for advancing their imperial agendas.
As a result, he deliberately distanced himself from the modern educational initiatives of his predecessor and prioritized religious education instead. Abdur Rahman Khan leveraged the existing religious educational structure for political purposes. He established a royal madrasa to train a group of loyal 'ulama' (religious scholars) who would advocate for a version of Islam that supported the monarchy's policies and countered radical, independent religious leaders(Lee, 2022). In doing so, he empowered conservative clerics by granting them influence over educational policy. This shift also introduced a new narrative that had previously been absent in Afghan statecraft: the portrayal of religious education as both a bulwark against foreign invasion and a custodian of national interests.
Amir Abdur Rahman Khan expressed significant skepticism regarding the spread of modern education to the general public. His reign lacked modern reforms and showed a clear reluctance toward progressive educational institutions. He did not take steps to improve the outdated education system or address the widespread issue of illiteracy. His distrust of progressive political and educational institutions stemmed from a belief that his lack of confidence in his own people rendered such reforms unfeasible. Furthermore, Afghan scholars and officials were discouraged from studying abroad during his leadership. The only noteworthy educational initiatives during this time involved the translation of a few military manuals into local languages (Lee, 2022).
However, his position revealed a contradiction: while he opposed public educational reform, he actively engaged with modern literature and strongly supported the education of his family and inner circle. This select group received rigorous training, often influenced by contemporary educational advancements, to prepare them for roles in political and administrative leadership. This model of elite education, limited to the ruling class, contributed to the formation of a political elite. Together, the Amir and the elite clerics maintained the socio-political status quo and upheld the monarchical structure that the Amir had intentionally established to ensure the continuation of his dynasty. This approach reflected his autocratic governance style and a desire to weaken any potentially competitive power structures, including those that could arise from new educational frameworks.
This stance had significant implications for the structure of the education system, reinforcing the monopoly of religious education as the sole legitimate form of learning. Consequently, modern education came to be viewed not only as distinct from but also as inherently oppositional to traditional religious instruction. This dichotomy was further reinforced by the ideological influence of Deoband Madrassa graduates in British India, who perceived—and often misinterpreted—modern education as a colonial instrument deployed by the British to undermine Islamic values and exert cultural dominance.
The narrative surrounding modern education in Afghanistan was deliberately constructed by the political and religious elite, and institutionalized as policy under Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. Unlike other Muslim-majority countries that sought to reconcile religious institutions with modern educational reforms, Afghanistan witnessed a systematic vilification of modern education. This antagonism granted religious clerics considerable authority to propagate their views, often invoking religious texts and mobilizing the expansive network of mosques and madrassas to influence public opinion and entrench resistance.
The implications of this narrative were both immediate and enduring. In the short term, it effectively obstructed the development of any meaningful modern educational infrastructure for the general public. Whatever minimal progress occurred in the four decades leading up to independence was limited to the establishment of a handful of schools, primarily designed to meet the bureaucratic needs of the state rather than to democratize access to knowledge. In the long term, the anti-modern-education discourse became deeply rooted within religious circles, reinforcing institutional opposition and shaping educational attitudes well into the 20th century—and indeed, its legacies continue to influence Afghan society to this day.
The foundations of anti-modern education policy, laid during the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, were inherited—both structurally and ideologically—by the clerics. The religious clerics who had been empowered under the Amir’s regime as custodians of religious education remained influential, and their continued resistance to educational reform proved to be a significant obstacle for Amanullah’s modernizing agenda.
In stark contrast to his grandfather’s approach, Amanullah Khan sought to reverse these regressive policies and actively pursued the modernization of Afghanistan’s education system. This marked a pivotal moment in the country’s history: the deliberate and institutionalized foundation of modern education. Following Afghanistan’s declaration of independence in 1919, Amanullah undertook sweeping reforms. Recognizing the fragile state of education, he initiated efforts to expand access and enhance quality. Notably, Article 68 of the 1923 Constitution enshrined the right to education for all citizens and made primary education compulsory.
His reformist vision materialized through a series of concrete initiatives: the establishment of Masturat School in Kabul in 1921, the country’s first formal school for girls; the extension of educational infrastructure to provincial areas; and the sponsorship of student missions abroad to acquire technical and academic expertise. Further institutional developments included the enactment of the first comprehensive education law and the establishment of the Ministry of Education in 1924, thereby laying the structural foundation for a national education system aimed at broad-based development.
Many scholars see the mid-19th century and early 20th century, especially the founding of Habibia High School in 1903, as the time when modern education in Afghanistan took shape. However, this view needs to be looked at again more closely. The early efforts to educate people, including the start of Habibia school, mainly served the needs of those in power and the military. They were not meant to make education available to everyone, nor did they show a complete plan for developing education across the country. Their main goal was to produce officials and military personnel, rather than to create a public education system that would bring about real change.
These institutions, in addition, only served boys and were not accessible to the general public, whether due to location or social status. As a result, they did not meet the basic requirements of inclusivity and systemic reform that are the foundation of modern education. It wasn't until King Amanullah Khan's reign that a clear, state-led vision for education emerged, aiming to democratize education across gender and social class. Instead of just increasing the number of schools, Amanullah carried out structural reforms to redesign the entire education system, making it part of the broader national modernization effort.
This change challenged the long-held control of religious leaders over education, disrupting a system that had resisted change and taught an anti-modern curriculum. The clerical establishment's reaction to Amanullah's reforms highlights the deep cultural and institutional conflicts that defined the early history of educational modernization in Afghanistan.
The religious clerical establishment—particularly its most powerful and politically connected figures—mounted strong resistance to the introduction of modern education during King Amanullah Khan’s reign. They perceived the expansion of modern schools, especially the establishment of girls’ schools, as a deliberate intrusion and a foreign conspiracy designed to undermine the religious and cultural sovereignty of Afghan society. This perception, often amplified through sermons and religious networks, exaggerated the intent and scope of the reforms, framing them as existential threats to Islamic values.
In response, King Amanullah actively challenged the clerical elite’s influence. He sought to delegitimize their authority by questioning the relevance of their traditional religious knowledge in a modernizing society and restricted their role within the judiciary, where they had long served as qazis (Islamic judges). This confrontation further escalated tensions, as the clerics increasingly politicized the education debate, portraying girls’ schooling in particular as an egregious violation of religious norms.
Through the strategic use of religious texts and the extensive reach of mosques and madrassas, clerics mobilized popular opposition to the king’s educational agenda. The notion of sending girls abroad for studies became a lightning rod for conservative backlash, reinforcing the clerical narrative of moral and cultural decline.
Importantly, girls’ schools were an unfamiliar and modern innovation in a society deeply rooted in traditional gender roles and conservative values. The absence of prior public engagement or social awareness campaigns left communities unprepared for such reforms, rendering them vulnerable to clerical propaganda and resistance.
The introduction of girls' schools in early 20th-century Afghanistan was a new and unprecedented development that created a strong need for information among the general public. Since the state made little effort to engage with communities or provide clear explanations, a lack of public discussion left an empty space that religious clerics quickly filled. As they already controlled the main way information was shared - the network of mosques and madrassas across the country - these clerics used their authority to spread false information and increase public fears. They portrayed girls' education as a threat to Islamic values and Afghan cultural identity, which led to resistance.
In the eastern provinces, especially Nangarhar, clerics rallied significant support and turned collective grievances into open rebellion. What started as opposition to educational reform soon grew into a broader uprising, driven by socio-political, religious, and some tribal discontent. These forces eventually led to the collapse of Amanullah Khan's reformist regime in January 1929 and his exile.
Notably, this uprising was the first major revolt in Afghanistan led by religious clerics, with girls' education at the heart of the political opposition. The consequences of this event have resonated for the past century. The clerics' view of modern education as foreign, immoral, and politically subversive has endured, shaping education policy. To this day, the legacy of this anti-modern education narrative and resistance continues to create challenges for equal access to education.
References:
Gregorian, V. (1969). The emergence of modern Afghanistan: Politics of reform and modernization, 1880–1946. Stanford University Press.
Lee, J. L. (2022). Afghanistan: A History from 1260 to the Present. United Kingdom: Reaktion Books.