A core question in analyzing totalitarian rule is whether such regimes genuinely represent an ethnic group, especially when the rulers are ethnically categorized as members that group, despite being largely disconnected from its language and culture.
The distinction between culture and political history of a country should be seen critically, considering whether there is a two-dimensional relationship between the two. Do cultural groups represent the same identity and values as the political one? If representation matters in defining political legitimacy, and if the ethnic group in question constitutes a demographic majority, then logically, the system should be democratic, not authoritarian.
Afghanistan represents a diverse cultural and political history that encompasses all ethnic groups; however, its history is distinct from that of any single ethnic or linguistic group. When we refer to the culture or political system of Afghanistan, it is quite different from discussing the cultural or political identity of a specific ethnic group. Additionally, their political history and system may not align with their tribal or ethnic structures. If there are discrepancies between political and cultural histories, why are they often conflated to support a particular viewpoint, or disregarded when they do not align with an argument? We should approach this issue as a matter of academic discourse rather than political one, examining the facts objectively rather than allowing personal biases to influence our perspective.
In Afghanistan's modern history, totalitarian rulers, both past and present, are often incorrectly viewed as representatives of a specific ethnic group in mainstream discussions. This conflation of political authority with ethnic identity is misleading, as the two can be misaligned or even contradictory. The underlying assumption is overly simplistic: categorizing a ruler or ruling group as part of an ethnic group without any form of representation implies they legitimately represent that group and that their actions reflect the collective will or responsibility of the entire ethnic community. This is a significant error.
Many leaders, whether consciously or unconsciously, have become detached from the cultural, linguistic, and social values of the ethnic groups they are meant to represent. A review of 19th and 20th-century leaders shows that, with a few exceptions, most did not speak the language of the ethnic group they were celebrated for representing. Additionally, they often did not see themselves as true representatives of the group's values and culture. Rather than embodying the community's aspirations, they frequently acted in ways that contradicted its core values, using ethnic identities primarily as instruments for political advantage or self-preservation.
The logic for this simplistic assumption, while emotionally resonant for some, lacks empirical support. It overlooks the structural nature of centralized power in Afghanistan, particularly since the late 19th century when tribal and ethnic considerations were increasingly replaced by an absolutist monarchy rooted in familial dynasties. Rulers did not articulate their legitimacy through ethnic identity, but rather through religious justification and the consolidation of centralized authority. No significant policy or official statement indicates a deliberate self-identification as ethnic representatives.
That said, while rulers may not have explicitly declared an ethnic agenda, their governance practices often suggest otherwise. It is plausible—and necessary—to examine whether discriminatory policies and preferential treatment implicitly benefited certain groups while marginalizing others. This is especially relevant in sectors like education, where access and inclusion are key indicators of equity.
Looking at enrollment data from the inception of modern education in Afghanistan, there is clear and consistent evidence of the marginalization of specific ethnic groups—particularly those often labeled as being aligned with or represented by the totalitarian rulers. In contrast, other groups received disproportionately greater access and institutional support. This pattern holds true across several social service indicators.
Critics may respond by attributing low enrollment or limited access to cultural norms within certain ethnic communities, arguing that these groups did not value education. Yet, such claims are rarely supported by evidence. On the contrary, public opinion surveys conducted between 2006 and 2021 reveal that approximately 85% of Afghans support educational equality for both men and women, with no significant variation across ethnic lines. This suggests a broad societal consensus in favor of equal access to education.
It is crucial to recognize the Taliban as an extremist group characterized by a distinct religious ideology, political structure, and identity, which differentiates it from the diverse cultural and ethnic groups within Afghanistan. The Taliban arose as an extremist movement in response to the devastation of civil war and has since developed in reaction to modernization reflecting the historical tensions between modernists and traditionalists. This religious political movement, which is fundamentally at odds with Afghan society in both its form and scope, is unprecedented in history and contradicts the foundational institutions of Afghan society, such as the Jirgas. These Jirgas traditionally empower decision-making within ethnic and tribal frameworks. Following their return to power in mid-August 2021, the Taliban banned all ethnic councils and tribal Jirgas, substituting them with their own version of religious councils.
It is evident that totalitarian regimes like the Taliban pursue their agendas through extreme measures, operating outside of conventional cultural or political frameworks and instead at the fringes. This necessitates countercultural actions and the dismantling of existing institutions and values, replacing them with new constructs that align with their ideology.
In reality, totalitarian and autocratic regimes in Afghanistan—historically and presently—have manipulated ethnic and racial identities not out of genuine allegiance or concern for those communities, but as instrumental and mutable constructs used to justify power, exclude rivals, and maintain authoritarian control. These regimes have systematically denied services and rights not because of ethnic favoritism in any genuine sense, but to ensure that a politically aware and empowered public—particularly the majority—does not emerge to challenge the regime’s absolute authority. In short, the suppression of rights is not about ethnic representation; it is about preserving power through enforced obedience and manufactured division.