Academic Governance in Higher Education and Changes Under the Taliban
The Taliban's takeover of state power in mid-August 2021, leading to the collapse of the Islamic Republic, has introduced a fundamentally different approach to academic governance—one that centralizes all significant decisions within the higher education sector. In contrast to the Republic-era framework, which, while highly regulatory, still permitted participation from universities in curriculum design, program approval, and faculty recruitment, the Taliban have concentrated nearly all authority in the office of the Minister of Higher Education (MoHE) and, for broader ideological matters, in the Supreme Leader. Both public and private institutions now operate within a strictly hierarchical command structure that allows no room for institutional discretion.
During the Republic, academic decision-making involved a limited yet genuine form of shared governance. In public universities, ministerial approval was required, but institutional senates, departmental committees, and inter-university councils could influence outcomes by presenting well-reasoned proposals and forming coalitions. Private higher education institutions (PHEIs) had relatively more freedom to launch new programs, revise curricula, and hire faculty, provided their initiatives complied with MoHE standards and accreditation requirements. This hybrid model—where state regulation was balanced by institutional agency—has been dismantled. The Taliban have removed universities' residual autonomy, abolished the Supreme Council that previously acted as a decision-making body in academic governance, and shifted decision-making to the minister's office, subject to direct intervention by the Supreme Leader for ideologically significant policies.
Recent decrees illustrate the immediacy and extent of this hierarchy. In December 2022, the Minister issued an immediate ban on women's university attendance, disrupting ongoing final examinations and forcing institutions to expel female students without allowing them to finish their final exams. Shortly after, ministerially appointed inspection teams examined university libraries, removing books deemed inconsistent with Taliban doctrine. Such actions exemplify a governance system where university compliance is mandatory, enforced by the threat of punitive oversight.
The Taliban have also nullified the body of higher education laws and regulations established between 2001 and 2021. The MoHE's website has removed all previous legal documents, retaining only those issued after August 2021. This elimination has created a climate of legal uncertainty for administrators, where procedures and precedents can be overturned at any moment based solely on the ideological preferences of the ruling elite. To date, seven regulatory packages have been released: six adjust curriculum and program governance, while one restructures faculty affairs. Although varying in scope, each package reinforces a single principle— authority over academic matters rests with the minister, reflecting the Supreme Leader’s prerogative.
The new guidelines establish a top-down process for curriculum revision and program approval. Departmental proposals now undergo an extended review process: first, they are evaluated by ministry staff for technical coherence; next, they are assessed by the minister’s policy office for consistency with Sharia and Taliban ideological goals; and, if deemed acceptable, they proceed through multiple bureaucratic checkpoints before final approval. The minister possesses near-absolute discretion to accept, modify, or reject proposals, citing Sharia compliance, resource allocation, or ideological alignment. This process has led to the systematic removal of educational materials that promote critical thinking or analytical reasoning. Even seemingly innocuous resources—textbooks or visual aids—are banned if they diverge from the approved doctrinal narrative.
Faculty governance has undergone an equally significant transformation. The criteria for appointment, promotion, and retention now prioritize ideological loyalty over academic merit. Thousands of graduates from Taliban-aligned madrasa networks have been expedited into university teaching roles, displacing experienced academics whose expertise or independence may conflict with official doctrine. Promotion evaluations that once considered peer-reviewed publications or innovative teaching methods are now focused on adherence to the Taliban’s cultural and religious agenda. As a result, the academic labor market has been reshaped to prioritize ideological conformity over disciplinary rigor.
Gender discrimination is now codified rather than simply practiced. In addition to the nationwide ban on female students, the ministry has instructed institutions to eliminate mixed-gender instructional settings, re-segregate dormitories where they still exist, and revise educational materials to reflect what the Taliban deem “appropriate roles” for women in Afghan society. These directives are part of a broader shift in higher education from a developmental force envisioned under the Republic to a tool for ideological reinforcement.
The overall impact is the transformation of Afghan universities from constrained yet authentic centers of scholarship into administrative branches of the state’s ideological apparatus. Every curricular change, research proposal, or faculty appointment is directed back to a centralized authority: the Minister of Higher Education, acting as the custodian of the Supreme Leader’s vision. Proposals that do not align with that vision may remain unresolved indefinitely or be swiftly rejected. As a result, there is a growing exodus of experienced scholars, further deteriorating an already fragile research infrastructure and diminishing prospects for intellectual diversity.
Afghanistan’s higher education landscape thus exemplifies how an authoritarian regime can reshape academic governance to secure ideological dominance. By consolidating multi-layered decision-making structures into a single, vertically oriented command chain, the Taliban have eradicated the remnants of institutional autonomy that once allowed universities to foster critical and creative inquiry. What remains is a system designed to produce conformity rather than knowledge, obedience rather than discovery, and doctrinal reinforcement rather than scholarly discourse.
The Future Outlook
The Taliban's potential direction in higher education, particularly in academic governance, should be analyzed through the lens of totalitarian theory. Hannah Arendt differentiates totalitarianism from mere cultural conservatism by highlighting its pursuit of comprehensive control: the systematic eradication of individual spontaneity and freedom in favor of unwavering allegiance to a broader ideological vision. Juan Linz expands on this framework by noting that education in totalitarian regimes must reflect and promote the ruling ideology, suppressing dissent and fostering habitual conformity. In such systems, the articulation of ideology and the scholarship tied to it are not secondary concerns but essential components of governance.
By these standards, the Taliban aligns disturbingly well with the totalitarian model. Historical evidence and current practices suggest that the movement will continue to use academic governance as a tool for ideological reinforcement. Policies affecting women's rights and civil liberties, already part of their broader societal agenda, are expected to infiltrate university governance through a rigid, top-down approach.
There are no indications of any forthcoming ideological moderation. Taliban leaders have consistently stated that they will not compromise and that their doctrinal influence will continue to grow. This commitment is evident in an increasing number of regulations, notably the Law on the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (PVPV), enacted in August 2024. This law codifies the Taliban’s vision for Afghan society, defining the acceptable roles of men and women and outlining punitive measures for violations.
The PVPV enshrines and amplifies a projected "pure" Sharia order, restricting women’s political, civil, and human rights as recognized by international law. It enforces coercive measures; for example, women are prohibited from speaking, singing, or mourning audibly in public, and Article 13 requires them to cover their voices when outside their homes. The ordinance also bans women and girls from traveling or accessing public spaces, including parks and educational institutions, without a male guardian (mahram). Gender segregation in public spaces becomes mandatory (Taliban Ministry of Justice, 2024).
The implementation of this law is overseen by the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, supported by thousands of religious police and other governmental bodies. Within higher education institutions, these agents regulate staff appearance, enforce gender segregation, and require the removal of literature deemed incompatible with Taliban ideology. Under these constraints, the Ministry of Higher Education and individual universities must manage academic governance in strict accordance with PVPV regulations.
As a result, Afghanistan has entered a fully realized totalitarian phase, leading to ongoing and escalating limitations on academic freedom and institutional independence. Two key dynamics will shape the future of the sector: first, the subordination of higher education to the Taliban's socio-political goals; and second, the continuous expansion of state oversight to ensure ideological compliance across all higher education institutions, both public and private.
Any remaining space for independent decision-making represents the last vestige of academic freedom; however, this space has become so limited that even the fundamental principles of free inquiry are nearly unattainable. Regulations stemming from the PVPV—and reinforced by additional decrees—permeate every aspect of institutional autonomy, preventing genuine academic self-governance and creating an environment where scholarship is only permissible to the extent that it aligns with the regime's ideological demands.