Academic Governance in Higher Education Institutions Under Republic (2002-2021)

The modern era of higher education in Afghanistan began with the fall of the Taliban in late 2001 and encompasses the Republic period from 2001 to 2021, continuing into the post-August 2021 phase following the Taliban's return. The first decade of the Republic, the 2000s, was characterized by significant reconstruction efforts: universities were rebuilt, new schools and programs were created and expanded to address the damage caused by years of conflict. The second decade, the 2010s, were concentrate, along with expansion, in standardization and quality improvement, and the discourse between control and autonomy in achievements in enrollment, faculty development, and curriculum modernization, alongside ongoing challenges to academic freedom.

The Taliban's return in August 2021 has led to a significant reversal of many achievements made during the Republic era, evident in increased control over academic governance, ban toward women's access to higher education, and a reduction in the range of acceptable fields of study—indicating a decline in both the scope and autonomy of Afghanistan's university sector.

The Republic Era

The Republic era in Afghanistan, though formally inaugurated by the democratic constitution and elections of 2004, can be traced back to the collapse of the Taliban regime in late 2001 and extended through successive temporary and transitional administrations until its eventual fall in August 2021. This period, for higher education, represents an unprecedented achievements: the expansion of higher education institutions (HEIs), academic freedom, and the promotion of gender equality transformed a sector long constrained by conflict and ideological closure.

The 2004 Constitution enshrined the principle of equality between men and women in all spheres of public life, including higher education. Subsequent legislation and regulatory frameworks operationalized this commitment by guaranteeing equal learning opportunities across genders — a direct reversal of policies under the previous Taliban regime. As a result, student enrollment and faculty composition exhibited historic growth, with total enrollments rising from few thousands in 2001 to more than one hundred thousands in 2010. The proliferation of both public and private higher education institutions, particularly in provincial centers and selected districts, enhanced geographic access and, in many instances, affordability.

Despite this progress, there were systematic challenges rooted in corruption, malfunction beaucracy and political interferences that restricted the effectivenss of access and academic governance in HEIs.

The Size of HEIs

Historically, the scale of Afghanistan’s higher-education system has mirrored the state’s vision for its role in society. In the mid-twentieth century, only one publicly funded university existed for the entire country, and reserved for a narrow elite: total enrollment rose modestly from 456 students in 1950 to 1,694 by 1960, demonstrating that higher education functioned more as a symbol of accommodating the government beauracracy than as a vehicle for widespread social and economic developments. Although the late 1960s and 1970s witnessed a gradual acceleration—student numbers increasing from 1,694 in 1960 to over 7,800 by 1970 and 16,147 by 1977—the pace remained restrained. Women, who comprised approximately half the population, continued to constitute no more than 10–12 percent of enrollments throughout this period (Samadi, 2001)

During the 1980s, under Soviet influence, access broadened further: total enrollment climbed from roughly 18,000 in 1980 to 24,333 by 1990 with continued gender imbalance. This expansion was accompanied by the establishment of new regional universities—Balkh University in 1986, Herat University in 1988, and Kandahar University in 1991—thereby diversifying geographic access.

The first half of the 1990s marked the decline of the HE size, and drop down the enrollments to around 8,000, and at second half, and during the Taliban, to around 6,000 with the women's complete ban from universities.

The size of the HE in the 20th century is characterized by oscillation—elite elitism in the start, developmental expansion in 60 and 70s, ideological commandeering, and gendered exclusion in the 80s and 90s—reveals Afghan higher education as a political instrument more than an autonomous academic sphere. The persistent gender gap, sudden policy reversals under successive regimes, and the uneven geographic diffusion of institutions all point to a system whose resilience is constantly tested by shifting power dynamics.

In the decade following the Taliban’s collapse, Afghanistan’s higher education sector experienced significant growth, which initially appears to indicate a successful recovery from conflict. In 2001, there were only seven public universities with fewer than 7,000 students enrolled. However, by 2003, the number had increased to 30,000, with one-sixth being female. Enrollment continued to rise, reaching 75,000 (including 10,000 women) by 2008 and surpassing 100,000 by 2010. By 2012, over 180,000 students were engaged in tertiary education, and this figure soared to 367,000 by 2016. Privately operated HEIs, which were nonexistent in 2001, accounted for approximately 165,000 of the total enrollments in 2016, while public campuses expanded from seven to more than twenty-five, and private providers emerged in every province and reached to more than a hundred.

The private higher education saw remarkable growth, increasing from fewer than twenty institutions in 2009 to over 125 by 2015. In response to quality and financial stability concerns, the Department of Private Higher Education Institutes (DPHEI) implemented stricter registration requirements in 2013, necessitating clear evidence of financial health and academic viability (Ibrahimi, 2014; Afghanistan’s PHE Law, n.d.). A corresponding Gender Strategy highlighted the MoHE’s commitment to women's inclusion; however, despite these focused efforts, female enrollment remained below twenty percent, indicating the limitations of policy measures without broader structural reforms (Ibrahimi, 2014).

Moreover, equality remained a critical concern. Although women's enrollment increased from nearly zero to about 20 percent, this still fell short of achieving demographic equity and broader representation of women in academia and governance. The issue of equality was evident in a different form in private higher education institutions (PHEIs), where only those who could afford tuition and related expenses were able to enroll. This ultimately limited many individuals' access to education.

In summary, the post-2001 surge in Afghan higher education marks a significant shift from decades of repression, yet it is characterized by uneven inclusion, varying quality, and reliance on external support. Future research should therefore explore not only the sector’s growth and reach but also the institutional resilience and equity of opportunity that support its rapid expansion.

Academic Governance During Republic

The tension between governmental control through standardization and accountability programs and institutional autonomy has characterized Afghanistan's academic governance over the past two decades. Central to this tension is the enduring belief that higher education constitutes a public good and thus falls under governmental purview, either directly through public institutions or indirectly through private higher education institutions (PHEIs). This perspective is deeply rooted in Afghanistan's historical experiences, Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) precedents, and highly centralized political traditions.

Such government orientation established a governance framework that oscillates between regulated autonomy and direct control. The Republic era (2001–2021) predominantly featured government-regulated autonomy, whereas the Taliban’s current regime reflects a heavily controlled governance modality. Historically, this contrast aligns the Republic period with governance styles observed in the 1960s and 1970s and positions the Taliban's era parallel to the centralized control dominant in the 1980s and 1990s.

Since the early 20th century, various Afghan regimes have consistently emphasized the alignment of universities with state objectives rather than to market or people's demands. Nonetheless, the extent of MoHE authority has varied significantly with fluctuating degrees of institutional autonomy, influenced by shifts between centralized standardization and decentralized innovation.

The Republic era witnessed two distinct phases in academic governance, shaped profoundly by these competing demands of control and autonomy.

The 2000s:

In the aftermath of the Taliban’s fall (2002–2010), MoHE, in collaboration with international organizations, prioritized rebuilding the fragmented higher education system. This era focused extensively on reconstructing administrative and policy frameworks to regain governmental oversight. By early 2002, MoHE had reasserted control through elections for chancellors at public universities, reclaiming critical functions such as faculty appointments, degree conferrals, and the administration of the national admissions examination (Kankor), realigning with traditional governance practices articulated in Afghanistan’s 1931 and 1948 constitutions (Babury & Hayward, 2014; MoHE, 2009c; Samady, 2001).

Concurrently, the 2004 Constitution’s Article 43 formally allowed private investment in higher education, leading to the establishment of significant institutions such as the American University of Afghanistan and Kardan Institute by 2006 (Ibrahimi, 2014). To manage this burgeoning private sector, MoHE introduced provisional regulations in 2006, formalized by Cabinet approval in 2007. Although these regulations lacked explicit legal grounding in the 1989 higher education law, they revealed the government's cautious approach toward market-driven expansion, mandating a 20 percent female enrollment quota to begin addressing gender disparities (Afghanistan’s PHE Law, n.d.; Ibrahimi, 2014).

Despite these advances, the absence of a comprehensive higher education law perpetuated uncertainties and contradictions between proclaimed autonomy and the regulatory dominance of MoHE, which retained considerable authority over critical academic decisions such as faculty hiring, curriculum design, and program establishment.

The 2010s:

By the early 2010s, MoHE shifted from ad hoc reconstruction to more systematic reforms characterized by increased regulatory oversight. The National Higher Education Strategic Plan (NHESP I, 2010–2014) articulated clear goals around expanding access, improving quality, and promoting equity (MoHE, 2009c; Babury & Hayward, 2014). Under this framework, Quality Assurance and Accreditation emerged prominently, with the establishment of the Quality Enhancement and Accreditation Department in 2011, followed by formal accreditation processes in mid-2012 (Mussawy & Rossman, 2018). Further formalization included the adoption of merit-based hiring and promotion policies in 2009, replacing patronage-based practices, and extensive curriculum reforms adopting international standards and student-centered pedagogies (Hayward, 2015; MoHE, 2012; Abdulbaqi, 2009).

Despite such structured developments, three critical factors limited genuine autonomy. First, weak enforcement mechanisms allowed corruption, nepotism, and inconsistent regulatory application to persist, undermining meritocratic policies (Hayward, 2015). Second, inadequate resources and human capital, highlighted by only 5.2 percent of faculty holding doctoral degrees as of 2008 and outdated infrastructure, restricted efforts to enhance academic quality (Roof, 2015; Babury & Hayward, 2014). Third, political and ideological pressures from religious and factional networks continued to significantly influence institutional decisions, effectively limiting autonomy despite strategic declarations promoting higher education’s independence and economic role (Couch, 2018; MoHE, 2009c).

Both the 2000s and 2010s maintained the tension between centralized regulation and institutional autonomy, complicated by persistent corruption, resource limitations, and MoHE's historical tendency towards centralization. Although early privatization initiatives emerged in the 2000s, the following decade saw systematic strategies aiming for quality control but repeatedly compromised by institutional shortcomings and political interference, ultimately consolidating governmental control (Report, 2018).

Public dissatisfaction with institutional performance prompted further MoHE expansion in regulatory frameworks, emphasizing state-centric governance and adopting stringent oversight mechanisms. These top-down reforms, aimed at enhancing compliance and academic standards, inevitably exacerbated tensions between autonomy and accountability.

In conclusion, the Republic era embodied a contested governance space, wherein competing visions of institutional autonomy and centralized regulatory control continuously interacted. Understanding this dialectic provides essential context for analyzing the enduring challenges facing Afghanistan's higher education sector following the regime shift in 2021.

The Legal and Policy Framework of Academic Governance

Throughout recent decades, Afghanistan's higher education governance has predominantly operated under a centralized model wherein the state exercised a legal monopoly over universities. Historically, under successive political regimes, higher education institutions (HEIs) served dual—and often contradictory—objectives: promoting national development and facilitating ideological indoctrination.

The turn of the twenty-first century marked a notable shift from state-centric governance toward a market-oriented approach inspired by international experiences, particularly from the United States. This approach emphasized institutional autonomy, reduced bureaucratic regulation, and introduced frameworks for effective accountability. Consequently, between 2001 and 2021, governance in Afghan higher education continually oscillated between the competing paradigms of autonomy and accountability.

The 2004 Constitution was pivotal in restructuring higher education, explicitly mandating the state to establish and manage HEIs while promoting "effective" and "balanced" educational programs. Significantly, it introduced higher education as a constitutional right, obliging the government to ensure equitable educational access irrespective of gender. Moreover, the constitutional framework opened the sector to private investment for the first time, creating opportunities for institutional diversification (Hayward, 2015; Ibrahimi, 2014; Ministry of Higher Education, 2009; Spink, 2005).

However, despite clear constitutional directives, ambiguity persisted regarding governance responsibilities, reflected in the delayed enactment of a dedicated Law on Higher Education. The resulting legal vacuum was filled with executive regulations rather than statutory clarity, creating tensions between the traditional, highly centralized governance model established in 1977 and newer, autonomy-oriented reforms. These contradictions culminated in a fragmented regulatory environment characterized by unclear institutional responsibilities, inconsistent legal standards, and entrenched bureaucratic practices.

In the initial post-2001 decade, reformers sought to embed greater autonomy into Afghan higher education, emphasizing market-driven principles and liberal governance frameworks borrowed from Western educational models. Private higher education institutions (PHEIs), operating without historical constraints, rapidly established independent governance structures, distinctive curricula, and flexible faculty hiring practices, epitomized by institutions like the American University of Afghanistan. Public universities, however, largely remained tethered to the Ministry of Higher Education’s (MoHE) historically centralized governance approach.

By the early 2010s, the initial optimism surrounding deregulation had diminished, as concerns over academic quality and accountability emerged. Responding to these criticisms, the MoHE progressively tightened its regulatory grip, instituting rigorous accreditation criteria, comprehensive quality assurance standards, and extensive supervisory mechanisms over both private and public HEIs. Previously perceived as barriers to institutional growth, regulatory frameworks were increasingly justified as essential tools for maintaining academic integrity and institutional accountability.

This regulatory shift intensified by the mid-2010s, driven by political imperatives to increase oversight, particularly targeting private institutions perceived as having overly permissive governance standards. Consequently, earlier models of shared governance—once celebrated as pathways to institutional innovation and academic freedom—were replaced by a reassertion of state control, compelling private universities to conform closely to public-sector standards and ministerial oversight.

In practice, despite formal declarations of institutional autonomy, governance processes became multilayered and bureaucratically complex. All major institutional decisions, from curricular revisions and program initiation to faculty promotions, were subjected to thorough review and approval processes managed by MoHE committees. These oversight practices effectively limited genuine autonomy, with institutional initiatives frequently delayed or altered based on alignment with national priorities, fiscal feasibility, or regulatory compliance.

Ultimately, Afghanistan's contemporary higher education governance emerged as a hybrid regime, formally promoting shared governance but substantively reinforcing state authority. This structure enabled significant initial sectoral expansion but simultaneously constrained opportunities for sustained innovation, critical scholarship, and responsiveness to evolving educational demands.

Legal

Academic Governance in Afghanistan’s Higher‑Education Institutions during the Republic Era

Prior to the 2015 Law on Higher Education, Afghanistan’s universities operated under a hybrid governance regime that formally dispersed authority yet substantively concentrated decision‑making power in the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE). Institutional bodies—departmental committees, faculty senates, and university councils—were empowered to craft proposals on curricula, research initiatives, and faculty appointments. These proposals, however, embarked on a sequential journey up the bureaucratic hierarchy. After gaining local endorsement, each initiative proceeded to MoHE review panels, where officials scrutinized alignment with national development priorities, budgetary ceilings, and statutory mandates. Even proposals that survived this appraisal frequently stalled for months, sometimes years, awaiting ministerial ratification. The result was a procedural culture that prized regulatory conformity over strategic autonomy.

Within public institutions, curricular design exemplified this dynamic. Departments might identify an emerging disciplinary niche—say, environmental engineering—draft new syllabi, and secure faculty‑senate approval, only to confront an MoHE insistence on harmonizing the proposed program with centralized workforce‑planning projections. The iterative revisions that ensued often diluted local academic vision in favor of standardized templates. Faculty hiring and promotion followed a parallel pattern. Rector‑appointed committees evaluated dossiers and issued recommendations, yet final appointment letters remained conditional upon MoHE countersignature, effectively rendering institutional judgments advisory rather than decisive.

Private higher‑education institutions (PHEIs), initially celebrated for agility and market responsiveness, gradually experienced similar encroachment. As PHEIs proliferated, public concern over quality assurance and equitable access mounted. In response, the MoHE expanded its regulatory toolkit—accreditation benchmarks, annual performance audits, and compliance inspections—blurring the once‑sharp boundary between public and private governance. By the late Republic period, PHEIs navigated nearly the same multilayered approval channels as their public counterparts, eroding their early comparative advantage in decisional speed and curricular innovation.

Codification and Consolidation: The 2015 Higher Education Law

Enacted after protracted legislative debate, the 2015 Higher Education Law (revised in 2017) codified this multilevel hierarchy rather than rebalancing it. The statute explicitly delineates a cascade of academic authority. Departments stand as the genesis of scholarly initiative, empowered to propose new courses, research agendas, and staffing plans. Faculty‑level Academic Councils provide the first institutional checkpoint, assessing disciplinary coherence, resource requirements, and pedagogical soundness. University senates then integrate these vetted proposals into broader strategic frameworks, allocating budgets and aligning initiatives with institutional missions. Yet each successive approval is provisional until the MoHE’s Supreme Council issues its imprimatur. The Council wields exclusive authority to endorse or veto academic programs, ratify accreditation standards, determine salary scales, and, through an expansive “perform any other duties” clause, intervene in virtually any domain of higher‑education governance.

The Supreme Council’s omnipotence transforms the ostensibly collegial architecture into a tightly coupled command chain. Departments continue to incubate intellectual innovation, but their proposals are refracted through multiple layers of review, each susceptible to shifting political winds or informal patronage networks. Delays become structural: the Council convenes episodically, its agenda crowded with directives extending from national development plans to ad hoc ministerial priorities, leaving departmental ambitions in bureaucratic limbo. Consequently, governance mechanisms designed to balance expertise with oversight often convert into chokepoints that arrest curricular reform and disincentivize interdisciplinary experimentation.

Implications for Institutional Autonomy and Academic Trajectory

The Republic‑era framework sought to reconcile two imperatives: ensuring higher education’s contribution to nation‑building while fostering scholarly excellence through decentralized expertise. In practice, however, centralization prevailed. Universities remained legally obligated to advance state objectives—economic modernization, human‑capital development, and cultural cohesion—yet they possessed limited latitude to tailor programs to regional labor markets or emerging research frontiers. This tension was most visible in attempts to transition from teaching‑focused institutions to research‑intensive universities. Establishing graduate programs or securing external research grants required MoHE sanction at every stage, discouraging faculty from pursuing initiatives that fell outside pre‑defined strategic corridors.

The governance model thus produced a paradox: institutional autonomy existed in statute but not in substance. Departments and councils performed meticulous internal deliberations, yet their decisions could be overturned—or indefinitely suspended—by ministerial fiat. While the system ensured procedural accountability and national‑policy coherence, it also entrenched risk aversion, slowed responsiveness to societal needs, and narrowed the horizon of permissible intellectual inquiry.

Conclusion

Afghanistan’s Republic‑era academic governance crystallized a delicate, ultimately unstable equilibrium between collegial participation and ministerial supremacy. By codifying multilayered oversight without proportional devolution of authority, the 2015 Law institutionalized a decision‑making architecture that privileged bureaucratic control over academic self‑determination. The legacy is instructive: formal mechanisms of shared governance can, under conditions of pervasive ministerial veto, reinforce the very centralization they aim to temper, leaving higher‑education institutions poised more for compliance than for innovation.