Academic Governance in HE: Historic Background
Historically, higher education in Afghanistan was viewed as a public good, but in practice, access was limited to privileged groups, effectively making it a selective entitlement granted by state authorities. Throughout the twentieth century, the governance of higher education underwent significant changes in response to broader political dynamics and institutional developments.
This section examines the historical evolution of academic governance through three distinct phases: the initial period of institutional autonomy following the establishment of Kabul University in the 1930s; a subsequent phase of increasing state regulation and eventual centralization from the late 1960s until the end of the Communist regime; and a final period of institutional fragmentation and decline amid political instability, warlordism, and Taliban rule. Together, these phases illustrate the complex relationship between political authority and academic governance, highlighting how educational policy and institutional autonomy were influenced by prevailing ideological and political forces.
Phase 1 (1932–1977): The Emerengece of Higher Education and Institutional Autonomy in Academic Governance
The School of Medicine, Afghanistan's first higher education institution, was established in 1932, followed by the School of Law in 1938 and the School of Science in 1942(Babury & Hayward, 2014; Samady, 2001). These initial faculties operated under a board-of-trustees governance model, which allowed significant autonomy in curriculum development, faculty appointments, and other areas of academic governance. Eventually, these schools merged to form Kabul University, officially chartered as the first public university in 1946 (Samadi, 2001).
The trustee-led governance structure shielded emerging academic institutions from extensive bureaucratic control. Elected senates and presidential councils were empowered to independently set academic priorities and standards. However, the rapid growth of new faculties and academic programs, driven by societal needs and state objectives, prompted changes to this governance model. By the late 1940s, oversight shifted to a more centralized, state-regulated structure. The Minister of Education assumed ultimate governance authority, while decision-making responsibilities were shared among the university president, faculty deans, and an Academic Senate (Samadi, 2001).
At this time, Afghanistan's higher education was primarily focused on developing professional and technical competencies essential for expanding the national bureaucracy and improving public services. This focus aligned with mid-twentieth-century state-building goals, which prioritized the training of skilled administrators, engineers, and medical professionals. In the 1950s and 1960s, successive Five-Year Economic Development Plans recognized the critical role of higher education in modernization and social transformation. Alongside the domestic expansion of university campuses, scholarships were offered for specialized training abroad, creating a dual pathway for professional expertise. Notably, the first National Five-Year Development Plan of 1956 significantly increased investments in establishing new faculties, laboratories, and technical institutes, reinforcing the essential role of higher education in national development policy (Couch, 2018; Hayward, 2015; Samadi, 2001).
In line with mid-century developmental aspirations, subsequent governance under Afghanistan's constitutional monarchy gradually expanded government oversight of higher education. A key reform occurred in 1968 with the introduction of the "Constitutions of Universities," a legal framework that articulated a unified vision for all public tertiary institutions (Samadi, 2001). This framework extended beyond narrow professional and technical training to outline a tripartite mission: advancing scholarly knowledge, enhancing professional skills, and fostering social responsibility among graduates. The Constitutions also required universities to adopt and promote values aligned with national modernization and social reform agendas, reaffirming higher education as a vital instrument for socio-economic transformation (Samadi, 2001).
Despite significant mid-century expansion that broadened both the intellectual scope and institutional size of Afghanistan's higher education, academic governance structures remained firmly rooted in a centralized, state-regulated, shared-governance model. Influenced by European precedents, particularly the centralized systems of France and Germany, this governance approach provided limited institutional autonomy within the confines of ministerial directives (Couch, 2018). Leadership roles, including university presidents, deans, and Academic Senate members, were typically filled by individuals whose political alignment with state priorities was ensured. Ultimate oversight was held by a Board of Trustees chaired by the Minister of Education, while daily academic administration was managed by the University Academic Senate, nominally overseen by the university rector. Recommendations from the Senate regarding program initiation, research priorities, and faculty hiring required formal Board approval, ensuring that institutional activities aligned with national development and socio-economic objectives (Babury & Hayward, 2014; Roof, 2015; Samadi, 2001).
In 1977, under President Mohammad Daoud Khan's administration, a significant restructuring of governance occurred, sharply reducing institutional autonomy (Couch, 2018; Hayward, 2015; Ahmadi, 2022). Following the establishment of the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) in 1972, the regime created a Higher Education Council operating under the Council of Ministers. This body gained exclusive authority over university accreditation, approval of academic programs, budget allocations, and faculty appointments. As a result, university senates and presidential councils were relegated to advisory roles, with their recommendations needing final validation by the Council (Samady, 2001; Hayward, 2015; Ahmadi, 2022).
The Saur Revolution in April 1978 further solidified this centralized approach. The Higher Education Council was formally integrated into an expanded MoHE, centralizing all decisions related to campus planning, curriculum design, staffing policies, and infrastructure development. While earlier decades maintained a balance between state oversight and institutional self-governance, the post-1977 period established a strictly hierarchical governance system characterized by top-down control and a centralized focus on national development objectives over institutional autonomy. This highly centralized model continues to significantly shape Afghanistan's higher education governance framework today (Couch, 2018; Samady, 2001)
Phase 2: Centralization, State Control and Indoctronation(1978–1991)
The year 1978 marked a significant turning point for Afghanistan’s higher education system. In April, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) staged a coup against President Mohammad Daoud Khan, replacing the existing authoritarian Republic with a Marxist-Leninist regime (Couch, 2018; Hayward, 2015; Samady, 2001; Spink, 2005). Just eighteen months later, in December 1979, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan, supporting the PDPA regime with the strategic goal of instilling communist ideology into Afghan society, using higher education institutions (HEIs) as key tools for ideological dissemination (Couch, 2018; Fayez, 2012; Hayward, 2015; Samady, 2001; Spink, 2005).
The Soviet invasion sparked widespread opposition from the Afghan population, quickly escalating into armed resistance. This initiated a decade-long conflict between the Soviet-backed communist regime in Kabul and Afghan resistance groups, including local jihadi factions and thousands of radical Islamists from over fifty countries, supported by external allies (Braithwaite, 2012; Couch, 2018; Hayward, 2015; Karp, 1986; Samady, 2001; Spink, 2005).
Under the PDPA administration, public higher education institutions expanded significantly, coinciding with major changes in academic governance. With guidance from Soviet advisors, the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) transformed HEIs into strictly state-controlled entities. This restructuring diminished the institutional autonomy previously enjoyed before the 1978 coup, replacing it with stringent ideological oversight enforced by a one-party system. Rectors, deans, and academic staff were required to implement directives from the Revolutionary Council and the Council of Ministers, consolidating ultimate authority within the PDPA’s Supreme Leader (Kabul Times, 1980; Samady, 2001; Spink, 2005).
Central to the PDPA’s socio-cultural agenda was the concept of the “New Man”—an ideal citizen indoctrinated with communist values and committed to revolutionary principles. Universities became primary venues for promoting this model. The state-controlled Kabul Times frequently reported on seminars at Kabul University, highlighting themes like "Defence of Values" and "Defence of National Honour." These events encouraged loyalty to the literary and intellectual ideals of the PDPA’s "Great Leader," resembling Soviet-style personality cults. Students and faculty were recognized for displaying "patriotic sentiments" and for their willingness to prioritize revolutionary goals over personal interests, effectively redefining academic activity as revolutionary participation. As a result, academic freedom significantly declined, relegating rectors and deans to primarily administrative roles focused on implementing political mandates rather than fostering independent scholarship (Couch, 2018, 254; Hayward, 2015,Samadi, 2001; Kabul News, 1981).
Simultaneously, Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan saw the rise of alternative educational institutions, some evolving into private higher education providers. These entities aimed to prepare Afghan youth for active involvement in jihadi efforts against Soviet occupation. Ideological radicalization, heavily influenced by global Islamist radicals, became the foundation of these institutions. Although opposed to the PDPA’s state-controlled universities, these institutions similarly subordinated academic governance to doctrinal imperatives—this time Islamist rather than communist—thus continuing the trend of higher education serving primarily as a means of political indoctrination rather than a space for critical inquiry or scholarly independence (Samadi, 2001; Kabul Times, 1981-1985).
The escalation of the Soviet-Afghan war throughout the 1980s severely destabilized Afghanistan’s educational infrastructure. University campuses in frontline provinces suffered extensive physical damage, and the exodus of faculty and administrative personnel led to a significant decline in institutional effectiveness. By the late 1980s, public universities primarily operated within government-held urban areas, their academic rigor greatly compromised by the cumulative effects of warfare and ideological control (Samadi, 2001;Kamgar, 1998).
After the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989, President Mohammad Najibullah implemented a series of modest reforms aimed at easing Marxist-Leninist ideological control, briefly allowing for limited institutional discretion. However, years of centralized indoctrination and extensive wartime destruction severely constrained any meaningful restoration of pre-1978 academic standards. The subsequent collapse of central governance in 1992, along with ongoing civil unrest, hindered any possibility for significant institutional recovery (Kamgar, 1998).
In summary, the period from 1978 to 1991 established a distinct model of state-centered academic governance in Afghanistan, characterized primarily by ideological conformity and political loyalty at the expense of scholarly autonomy. Both the Soviet-supported regime and its Islamist counterparts utilized universities as tools for ideological indoctrination, leaving a lasting legacy of centralized control and significantly impaired intellectual freedom.
Phase 3: Fragmentation, Civil War and Contiuned Indoctronation (1992–2001)
The period following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 marked a significant political upheaval in Afghanistan. President Mohammad Najibullah, who led from 1987 to 1992, had maintained a close alliance with the Soviet Union, relying heavily on military, political, and economic support. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of troops in early 1989 severely weakened his regime (Hiro, 2012).
With Najibullah’s government collapsing in April 1992 due to internal dissent and external pressures, Afghanistan fractured into competing mujahideen factions. These Islamist resistance groups, initially united against the Soviet occupation, included at least seven major formations by 1992. Each faction was led by prominent commanders representing various ethnic, ideological, and regional interests (Hiro, 2012).
In April 1992, the mujahideen factions nominally formed the Islamic State of Afghanistan under President Burhanuddin Rabbani. However, intense rivalries over power-sharing quickly escalated into a destructive civil war that lasted from 1992 to 1996, severely damaging the country’s infrastructure and governance (Hiro, 2012).
Amid this prolonged instability, the Taliban—a religious fundamentalist movement founded by Mullah Muhammad Omar in Kandahar in late 1994—emerged as a significant force. Promising to restore security through strict enforcement of Shari’a law, the Taliban captured Kandahar by November 1994 and took Kabul on September 27, 1996. They declared the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which lasted until their removal by a U.S.-led coalition and the Northern Alliance in November 2001, following the September 11 attack (Hiro, 2012).
During the initial civil war period (1992–1996), Afghanistan’s higher education institutions experienced severe degradation due to ongoing armed conflict and factional governance. Academic governance was not constructively decentralized; instead, institutions fell under fragmented and coercive control by various factional leaders and local military commanders. Each institution was subject to the political and ideological dictates of the dominant local faction, leading to inconsistent and ideologically driven practices. Institutional autonomy and academic freedom were systematically suppressed across all factions, despite their ideological diversity. Infrastructure, particularly at Kabul University, suffered extensive damage from rocket attacks, looting, and targeted violence, resulting in widespread destruction of facilities, laboratories, and libraries. Additionally, the academic workforce significantly declined as qualified faculty members fled due to persecution, imprisonment, and violence (Hiro, 2012; Andishmand, 2010).
Under the subsequent Taliban regime (1996–2001), ideological control intensified, shifting from fragmented factional oversight to centralized religious indoctrination. Taliban authorities imposed strict restrictions on permissible academic subjects, adhering closely to a narrow interpretation of Islamic doctrine. Academic freedom was effectively eliminated, with curricula designed to ensure religious conformity. One of the most severe and discriminatory measures was the systematic exclusion of women from secondary and higher education, initiated in 1995 and fully enforced after their capture of Kabul. Before these restrictions, women constituted approximately 40% of higher education students, about 70% of teaching personnel in some faculties, and nearly 40% of medical professionals (Hiro, 2012; Andishmand, 2010).
Both the civil war period and the Taliban era were characterized by severe infrastructural destruction, significant loss of qualified faculty, and suppression of academic autonomy. However, a key difference lies in the fragmented ideological control during the civil war compared to the centralized and systematic religious indoctrination under the Taliban. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) played an important role in providing basic education during both periods; however, their efforts lacked coordination, resulting in inconsistent and locally varied curricula (Hiro, 2012; Andishmand, 2010).
Ultimately, the period from 1992 to 2001 represented a significant regression in Afghanistan's higher education sector, marked by ideological extremism, extensive infrastructural damage, systemic gender discrimination, and a profound erosion of institutional autonomy. The repercussions of this tumultuous era greatly hindered Afghanistan's subsequent educational rehabilitation and institutional reconstruction efforts.